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26 October 1959



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
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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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### DAILY BRIEF

#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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USSR: Soviet Defense Minister Malinovsky declared in a published statement of 23 October that Khrushchev's visit to the United States had "provided concrete opportunities for improving Soviet-American relations, liquidating the cold war, and ensuring world peace," and that the Soviet people, the army, and navy "unanimously" approved the results of the visit. The statement was apparently designed to underscore support for Khrushchev's current foreign policy moves from a quarter which would be most directly affected by any significant changes in the USSR's military posture.

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USSR: The meeting of the Supreme Soviet, scheduled to open on 27 October will probably hear a statement on Soviet foreign policy, in addition to taking up domestic economic questions. Both the annual economic plan and the state budget for 1960 are

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slated to be presented at this session, the first since December 1958. Action on a new labor code will probably be another item on the agenda. Khrushchev is also likely to seek the formal approval of the Supreme Soviet, nominally the USSR's highest government body, for his current posture of detente in relations with the West. [REDACTED]

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North Korea: The replacement of Foreign Minister Nam Il, who had headed the ministry for six years, by one of his deputy foreign ministers, Pak Sung-chol, does not appear to presage a change in Pyongyang's foreign policy. The 46-year old Nam retains his post as a vice premier, and probably will continue as party presidium member, suggesting that he is not in disfavor or that a shakeup is pending in the party hierarchy. On 12 October he was elected together with Kim Il-sung and other top party leaders to the executive body of a major conference on economic affairs. Pak Sung-chol, who has risen fast in the foreign ministry, became the director of the party central committee's international department in October 1958. [REDACTED]

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

India - Communist China: The Indian public has reacted strongly against the killing of Indian border guards in Ladakh on 21 October by Chinese Communist troops, and the Indian Government will have no choice but to take a firm stand. Nehru, while condemning this aggression has, however, appealed to the public not to act "merely in anger and passion." Officials in the Ministry of External Affairs now seem to feel that Peiping will continue to use force to back up its territorial claim. The Communist party of India, which has already suffered a considerable loss of prestige as a result of the border dispute, on 24 October issued a resolution announcing that it shared the "deep resentment and indignation among our people," thus officially siding with the Indian people against the Chinese Communists. [REDACTED]

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DAILY BRIEF

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Laos: [The situation in southern Laos, where government forces are weak and Communist propagandizing and terrorization are increasing, has quietly deteriorated over the past month, according to the American Embassy in Vientiane. Unless this trend can be checked, the government may find its authority limited only to the larger towns. The government has postponed, possibly for only a few days, the trial of pro-Communist leaders originally announced for 26 October.] [redacted] [redacted]

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### III. THE WEST

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Cuba: Fidel Castro's vitriolic attacks on opinions which diverge in any way from his own, his recently increased rabble-rousing, and the appointment of known leftists to high offices all indicate a real threat of extremist control over the Cuban leader.

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[redacted] there is almost no hope that Castro can now be influenced to moderate the course of his regime or to recognize the danger of Communism. Castro will probably use the "rally of the million" which he has called for 26 October to incite anti-Americanism by further accusations that the US is aiding forces working to defeat his revolution.

\*Demonstrations in front of the American Embassy are likely.

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

Situation in Laos

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[redacted]

The American Embassy in Vientiane, summarizing recent reports, concludes that the situation in southern Laos has "quietly deteriorated" over the past month. Communist propagandists and terrorists are having increasing success among the region's tribesmen whose already limited contact with central government authority has been reduced further by transfers of army troops to northern Laos. The tribal peoples' fear of the Communists and lack of faith in the army are reported as the main reasons for the swing to the Communists. The embassy believes it imperative that the Laotian Army begin and sustain offensive action, even if limited to strong patrols, in order to avoid a government loss of authority by default. Unless the populace in the south can be won over or at least effectively neutralized, the government may find itself holding only the larger towns there.]

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[redacted] have a similar impression of the decline of the royal government's authority in southern Laos. [redacted] point to steady progress being made by the Communist movement in extending disaffection throughout Laos, especially among the minorities. The Communists are establishing their own administrations over areas they now control and are indoctrinating the local populace and recruiting troops.]

The trial of Prince Souphannouvong and other pro-Communist leaders, scheduled to begin on 26 October, has been postponed. Among the reasons [redacted] is that both sides require more time to prepare their cases. A high Justice Ministry official told an American Embassy officer shortly after the announcement of postponement that the trial would begin before the end of this week and that some defendants would be tried "in absentia," possibly indicating government plans to strike at the entire top leadership of the pro-Communist Neo Lao Hak Zat as represented by the party's central committee.] [redacted]

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